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Abstract—The increasing penetration of renewable energy in
recent years has led to more uncertainties in power systems.
These uncertainties have to be accommodated by flexible re-
sources (i.e. upward and downward generation reserves). In this
paper, a novel concept, Uncertainty Marginal Price (UMP), is
proposed to price both the uncertainty and reserve. At the same
time, the energy is priced at Locational Marginal Price (LMP). A
novel market clearing mechanism is proposed to credit the gener-
ation and reserve and to charge the load and uncertainty within
the Robust Unit Commitment (RUC) in the Day-ahead market.
We derive the UMPs and LMPs in the robust optimization
framework. UMP helps allocate the cost of generation reserves
to uncertainty sources. We prove that the proposed market
clearing mechanism leads to partial market equilibrium. We find
that transmission reserves must be kept explicitly in addition to
generation reserves for uncertainty accommodation. We prove
that transmission reserves for ramping delivery may lead to
Financial Transmission Right (FTR) underfunding in existing
markets. The FTR underfunding can be covered by congestion
fund collected from uncertainty payment in the proposed market
clearing mechanism. Simulations on a six-bus system and the
IEEE 118-bus system are performed to illustrate the new concepts
and the market clearing mechanism.
Index Terms—Uncertainty Marginal Price, Cost Causation,
Robust Unit Commitment, Financial Transmission Right, Gen-
eration Reserve, Transmission Reserve
NOMENCLATURE
Indices
i, l, t indices for generators, lines, and time intervals
m,n index for buses
mi index of bus where unit i is located
k index of the worst point for uncertainty
Functions and sets
ˆ symbol for the optimal value of a variable
F feasible set for UC and dispatch
U uncertainty set
CPi (·), CIi (·) cost related to dispatch and UC for unit i
L(·) Lagrangian function
G(m) set of units located at bus m
K set of the indices for ˆk
This work is supported by the U.S. National Science Foundation Grant
ECCS-1549937. The early version of this work was available on arXiv July
06, 2015, titled “Market Clearing for Uncertainty, Generation Reserve, and
Transmission Reserve”. The authors are with the Galvin Center for Electricity
Innovation at Illinois Institute of Technology, Chicago, IL 60616, USA. (e-
mail: hye9@hawk.iit.edu; yge9@hawk.iit.edu; ms@iit.edu; lizu@iit.edu).
Kupm,t,Kdownm,t set of indices k for upward and downward
UMPs at bus m time t
Constants
ND, NT number of buses and time intervals
dm,t aggregated equivalent load
Fl transmission line flow limit
Γl,m shift factor for line l with respect to bus m
Pmini , P
max
i minimum and maximum generation outputs
rui , r
d
i ramping-up/down limits between sequential in-
tervals
Rui , R
d
i ramping-up/down limits for uncertainty accom-
modation
um,t bound for uncertainty
ˆ ˆk is the kth worst uncertainty vector in K, ˆk ∈
RNDNT , ˆkm,t ∈ R
FTRm→n FTR amount from bus m to n
Variables
Ii,t unit on/off status indicators
yi,t, zi,t unit start-up and shut-down indicators
Pi,t generation dispatch
P injm,t net power injection
m,t uncertainty at bus m time t
Z optimal value of problem (SP) given
(x, y, z, I, P )
∆Pi,t generation re-dispatch
∆f posl,t transmission capacity reserve in positive direction
∆f negl,t transmission capacity reserve in negative direc-
tion
∆P injm,t net power injection change
λt, λ
k
t Lagrangian multipliers
α, β, η non-negative Lagrangian multipliers
pim,t marginal prices. piem,t for energy price; pi
u,k
m,t is the
UMP for kth uncertainty point; piu,upm,t for upward
UMP; piu,downm,t for downward UMP
Qupi,t, Q
down
i,t upward and downward generation reserves
Ψm,t charge for uncertainty source
ΘGi,t,Θ
T
l,t credits to generation reserve for unit i and trans-
mission reserve for line l at time t
I. INTRODUCTION
IN modern power systems, uncertainties grow significantlywith the increasing penetration of Renewable Energy
Source (RES), such as wind power generation. They pose
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2new challenges for the operation of electricity markets. In the
Day-ahead market (DAM), the Unit Commitment (UC) and
Economic Dispatch (ED) problems considering uncertainties
have become a focus of research in recent years. The objective
of the UC problem is to find the least cost UC solution
for the second day while respecting both system-wide and
unit-wise constraints. By fixing the UC variables, the ED
problem is established. The Locational Marginal Price (LMP)
and reserve price are then obtained as byproducts of the
ED problem [1], [2]. When considering the uncertainties, the
generation from uncontrollable RES are uncertain parameters
in the optimization problem.
Recently, Robust UC (RUC) is proposed to address the
issues of uncertainty [3]–[7]. The largest merit is that the
UC solution can be immunized against all the uncertainties
in predefined set. The key idea of the two-stage RUC is to
determine the optimal UC in the first stage which leads to
the least cost for the worst scenario in the second stage.
However, this approach is conservative and the Robust ED
(RED) is absent. Authors in [8] combined the stochastic and
robust approach using a weight factor in the objective function
to address the conservativeness issue. [9], [10] employed the
Affine Policy (AP) to formulate and solve the RED problem.
A Multi-stage RUC is proposed to incorporate the latest
information in each stage [11], where AP is also used to
overcome the computational challenge. Recently, we reported
a new approach which tries to bridge the gap of RUC and
RED [7], [12].
In DAM, the main difficulty for pricing is that RED is
absent in the traditional RUC [4], [5], [8]. On the other hand,
a large number of works on pricing reserves exists within
the UC framework considering contingencies [2], [13], [14]
and stochastic security [15]. They are normally modeled as
co-optimization problem. In [2], the reserve is cleared on
zonal levels. Instead of countable contingency scenarios [15]
or single additional scenario for reserve [16], the infinite
continuous uncertainties are considered in the RUC, and the
reserves are fully deliverable in infinite scenarios. In this
paper, we propose a novel mechanism to price the energy,
uncertainty, and flexibility simultaneously based on the RUC
in [7]. An explicit price signal is derived for pricing the
uncertainty. As the ED solution obtained is robust [7], both
marginal impacts of the uncertainty and flexibility are reflected
in these prices. In the proposed mechanism, reserve costs
are allocated to uncertainty sources. Generation reserves, also
called flexibilities in this paper, are the key factor for the
robust optimization approaches. They are entitled to proper
credits based on their contribution to uncertainty management.
According to the market equilibrium analysis, market partic-
ipants (price takers) can get the maximal profit by following
the ISO/RTO’s dispatch instruction.
The generation reserve and its deliverability are the main
focus in [7]. The definition of LMP in [17] are employed
to derive the energy price. The new concept, Uncertainty
Marginal Price (UMP), is proposed to define the marginal cost
of immunizing the next increment of uncertainty at a specific
location. Load and generation are a pair, and they are priced
at LMP. Uncertainty and flexibility (i.e., generation reserve)
are another pair, and they are priced at UMP. Both LMPs and
UMPs may vary with the locations due to transmission con-
gestions. Limited by the transmission capacity and power flow
equations, sometimes the uncertainties at certain buses cannot
be mitigated by the system-wide cheapest generation reserve,
and expensive generation reserve, which is deliverable, has
to be kept in the system. Therefore, uncertainty sources are
charged and generation reserves are credited based on UMPs
at the corresponding buses.
As the transmission reserve is kept within the RUC frame-
work, the congestion component may exist in both the energy
price and reserve price even if the physical limit of the line
is not reached yet in the base case scenario. LMP congestion
costs are distributed to Financial Transmission Right (FTR)
holders in the existing market according to the LMP differ-
ence and the FTR amount. The revenue inadequacy occurs
when the LMP congestion cost collected is smaller than the
credit distributed to FTR holders, which is also called FTR
underfunding. This has been a serious issue in recent years
in the industry [18], [19]. We reveal that transmission reserve
will be another reason for FTR underfunding when physical
transmission limit is adopted in Simultaneous Feasibility Test
(SFT) for FTR market [18], [20], [21]. This conclusion is
applicable to any robust UC framework for DAM.
The main contributions of this paper are listed as follows.
1) The novel UMP for uncertainties and generation re-
serves, as well as LMP for energy, are derived within a
robust UC framework. The derivation is for uncertainties
set with interval and budget constraints. The general
concepts still apply when other uncertainty sets are
modeled.
2) It is revealed that transmission capacities have to be
reserved for uncertainty accommodation and the trans-
mission reserves may cause FTR underfunding because
of the deficiency of energy congestion revenues based
on existing market rules.
3) A new market clearing mechanism is proposed to credit
the generation and reserve and to charge the load and
uncertainty. The payment collected from uncertainty
sources can exactly cover the credits to generation
reserves and transmission reserves, effectively resolving
the FTR underfunding issue.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Derivation of
the LMP and UMP is presented in Section II, so is the market
clearing mechanism for charge and credit based on LMP and
UMP. Case studies are presented in Section III. Section IV
concludes this paper.
II. RUC AND MARKET CLEARING
One motivation of this work is to price the uncertainty,
and allocate the cost of uncertainty accommodation to the
uncertainty source. As the uncertainty source is charged the
uncertainty payment, it has the incentive to reduce the uncer-
tainty. With UMP, we can follow the cost causation principle,
which is normally required in the market design, to charge the
uncertainty sources. Cost causation principle is described as
“require that all approved rates reflect to some degree the costs
3actually caused by the customer who must pay them” in KN
Energy, Inc. V. FERC, 968 F.2d 1295, 1300 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
Another important motivation is to provide a theory that
supports the application of the RUC in the DAM clearing.
Although the RUC/RED are studied extensively, the only
application of the RUC now is for the Reliability Assessment
Commitment (RAC) in the DAM. There are several reasons
why they are not applied in the DAM clearing. First, the
computation burden of RUC is much larger than the standard
UC. Second, as the objective is the cost of the worst-case sce-
nario [3], [5], the solution is criticized on over conservatism.
Third, no economic dispatch and prices are available within
the RUC framework. Recently, with the new achievements
in the algorithms, models, and high-performance computing
application [6]–[8], [22]–[24], the first two obstacles are being
addressed with great promises. This paper tries to clear the last
obstacle with the new model [7]. Adopting RUC in the market
clearing can give clear price signals for the uncertainties and
reserves. On the other side, it is also easier for the solution to
pass the robustness test, which is a RUC, in RAC. To our best
knowledge, this is the first work on pricing energy, uncertain-
ties, and reserves within the robust optimization framework in
DAM. Hence, we focus on illustrating the concept with the
following assumptions.
• Network loss is ignored. Shift factor matrix is constant.
• Uncertainty is from load and RES. Contingency is ig-
nored.
• The uncertainty budget set can be truly formulated by the
ISO/RTO.
A. RUC and RED
ISOs/RTOs desire to get the optimal UC and ED solution
in the base-case scenario. They can re-dispatch the flexible re-
sources, such as adjustable load demands and generators with
fast ramping capabilities, to follow the load when deviation
occurs (or uncertainty is revealed). Consistent with the robust
literature [4], [5], the uncertainty set is modeled as
U := { ∈ RNDNT : −um,t ≤ m,t ≤ um,t,∀m, t∑
m
|m,t|
um,t
≤ Λ∆t ,∀t}
Λ∆t is the budget parameter and assumed as an integer [3]. It is
noted that all the flexible resources are modeled as generators.
In this paper, the RUC is formulated according to the model
in [7].
(RUC) min
(x,p)∈F
CI(x) + CP (p)
s.t. Ax+Bp ≤ b (1)
F :=
{
(x, p) : ∀ ∈ U ,∃∆p such that
Cx+Dp+G∆p ≤ d+ E
}
. (2)
The basic idea of the above model is to find a robust UC and
ED for the base-case scenario. The UC x and dispatch p are
immunized against any uncertainty  ∈ U . When uncertainty 
occurs, it is accommodated by the generation adjustment ∆p.
Please refer to Appendix A for the detailed formulation.
Column and Constraint Generation (CCG) based method is
used to solve the above model [6]. Problem (MP) and (SP)
are established as follows.
(MP) min
(x,p)
CI(x) + CP (p)
s.t. Ax+Bp ≤ b
Cx+Dp+G∆pk ≤ d+ Eˆk,∀k ∈ K (3a)
and
(SP) Z := max
∈U
min
(s,∆p)∈R()
1>s (4a)
R() :=
{
(s,∆p) : s ≥ 0 (4b)
G∆p− s ≤ d− Cx−Dp+ E
}
(4c)
where K is the index set for uncertainty points ˆ which are
dynamically generated in (SP) with iterations. Please refer to
Appendix B for the detailed formulation. It should be noted
that ˆk is the extreme point of U . Variable ∆pk is associated
with ˆk. The objective function in (SP) is to find the worst
point in U given (x, p). The procedure is
1: K ← ∅, k ← 1,Z ← +∞, define feasibility tolerance δ
2: while Z ≥ δ do
3: Solve (MP), obtain optimal (xˆ, pˆ).
4: Solve (SP) with x = xˆ,p = pˆ, get solution (Z, ˆk)
5: K ← K ∪ k, k ← k + 1
6: end while
Once the procedure is converged, we also get the optimal
UC and ED solution by solving (MP). Similar to traditional
LMP calculation, we fix the binary variables as xˆ. Then a
convex linear programming problem (RED) can be formed as
(RED) min
P,∆P
∑
t
∑
i
CPi (Pi,t) (5)
s.t.
(λt)
∑
i
Pi,t =
∑
m
dm,t,∀t, (6a)
(β¯i,t) Pi,t ≤ Iˆi,tPmaxi ,∀i, t (6b)
(
¯
βi,t) −Pi,t ≤ −Iˆi,tPmini ,∀i, t (6c)
(α¯i,t) Pi,t − Pi,t−1 ≤ rui (1− yˆi,t) + Pmini yˆi,t,∀i, t (6d)
(
¯
αi,t) −Pi,t + Pi,t−1 ≤ rdi (1− zˆi,t) + Pmini zˆi,t,∀i, t (6e)
(η¯l,t)
∑
m
Γl,mP
inj
m,t ≤ Fl,∀l, t (6f)
(
¯
ηl,t) −
∑
m
Γl,mP
inj
m,t ≤ Fl,∀l, t (6g)
(λkt )
∑
i
∆P ki,t =
∑
m
ˆkm,t,∀t,∀k ∈ K (7a)
(β¯ki,t) Pi,t + ∆P
k
i,t ≤ Iˆi,tPmaxi ,∀i, t,∀k ∈ K (7b)
(
¯
βki,t) −Pi,t −∆P ki,t ≤ −Iˆi,tPmini ,∀i, t,∀k ∈ K (7c)
(α¯ki,t) ∆P
k
i,t ≤ Rui (1− yˆi,t),∀i, t,∀k ∈ K (7d)
(
¯
αki,t) −∆P ki,t ≤ Rdi (1− zˆi,t+1),∀i, t,∀k ∈ K (7e)
(η¯kl,t)
∑
m
Γl,m(P
inj
m,t + ∆P
inj,k
m,t ) ≤ Fl,∀l, t, ∀k ∈ K (7f)
(
¯
ηkl,t) −
∑
m
Γl,m(P
inj
m,t + ∆P
inj,k
m,t ) ≤ Fl,∀l, t, ∀k ∈ K,(7g)
4where (6a)-(6g) are the constraints for the base ED, and (7a)-
(7g) are constraints for different extreme points in U . (7a)
denotes the load balance after re-dispatch. The generation
adjustments respects capacity limits (7b)(7c) and ramping
limits (7d)(7e). Network constraints are denoted by (7f)(7g).
The P injm,t and ∆P
inj,k
m,t are defined as
P injm,t :=
∑
i∈G(m)
Pi,t − dm,t,∀m, t,
and
∆P inj,km,t :=
∑
i∈G(m)
∆P ki,t − ˆkm,t,∀m, t, k,
respectively.
B. Marginal Prices
In this section, marginal prices for the energy, uncer-
tainty, and generation reserve are derived based on the La-
grangian function. Denote the Lagrangian function for (RED)
as L(P,∆P, λ, α, β, η), which is shown in Appendix C. Ac-
cording to the definition of marginal price [17], the LMP for
energy at bus m is
piem,t =
∂L(P,∆P, λ, α, β, η)
∂dm,t
(8)
=λt −
∑
l
Γl,m
(
η¯l,t −
¯
ηl,t
)
−
∑
l
∑
k∈K
Γl,m
(
η¯kl,t −
¯
ηkl,t
)
It is observed that the impact of the uncertainty is also reflected
in the LMP.
The new concept, UMP for DAM, is defined as the marginal
cost of immunizing the next unit increment of uncertainty. For
ˆk, an extreme point of U , the UMP is
piu,km,t =
∂L(P,∆P, λ, α, β, η)
∂ˆkm,t
= λkt −
∑
l
Γl,m
(
η¯kl,t −
¯
ηkl,t
)
(9)
Both the uncertainty and generation reserve are priced at piu,km,t.
In the derivation of piu,km,t, the worst point ˆ
k is the only
concern. Therefore, the general principles in this paper still
work when U is replaced with other sets.
It should be noted that (9) is intermediate price signals. In
order to get the aggregated UMPs, the following new sets are
defined based on the sign of piu,km,t.
Kupm,t := {k : piu,km,t ≥ 0}; Kdownm,t := {k : piu,km,t < 0} (10)
The aggregated upward and downward UMPs are defined as
piu,upm,t :=
∑
k∈Kupm,t
piu,km,t; pi
u,down
m,t :=
∑
k∈Kdownm,t
piu,km,t (11)
respectively. In the following context, we will show how the
aggregated UMPs are used.
C. Market Clearing Mechanism
With LMP and UMP, the charges and credits for the
market participants become clear and fair in the DAM. Energy
clearing is straightforward. The basic principle related to
uncertainty and flexibility is that those who cause uncertainties
(uncertainty sources), such as RES, pay based on UMP and
those who contribute to the management of uncertainties
(uncertainty mitigators), such as generators or storage with
ramping capabilities, get paid.
1) Energy Payment and Credit: LSEs pay based on the
amount of the load and LMP. The energy payment from the
LSE at Bus m at t is piem,tdm,t. It should be noted that RES
is entitled to the credit due to the negative load modeled in
RUC. Generator i, located at Bus mi, is entitled to the credit
piemi,tPi,t for energy production.
2) Charge to Uncertainty Source: The uncertainty source
can be charged as
Ψm,t =
∑
k∈K
piu,km,tˆ
k
m,t (12)
The uncertainty source pays based on the marginal price and
the worst point ˆk. The uncertainty source is charged only
when piu,km,t is non-zero, and it may have to pay more when
the uncertainty becomes larger. The uncertainty point ˆkm,t can
be upward (i.e. ˆkm,t ≥ 0) or downward (i.e. ˆkm,t ≤ 0). We
have the following lemma regarding the relation between the
signs of piu,km,t and ˆ
k
m,t.
Lemma 1. If ˆkm,t > 0, then pi
u,k
m,t ≥ 0. If ˆkm,t < 0, then
piu,km,t ≤ 0.
Please check Appendix D-A for the proof. When the budget
set is adopted, the extreme point ˆkm,t ∈ {−um,t, 0, um,t} [4],
[7], so the uncertainty charge in (12) can also be written as
(13) according to Lemma 1 and (11).
Ψm,t = pi
u,up
m,tum,t + pi
u,down
m,t (−um,t) (13)
Thus, upward and downward uncertainties are charged sepa-
rately. It should be noted that we still need to use (12) when
other uncertainty sets are used.
3) Credit to Generation Reserve: Only resources that can
provide deliverable generation reserve are entitled to credits.
If i ∈ G(m), then the credits can be formulated as
ΘGi,t =
∑
k∈K
piu,km,t∆P
k
i,t. (14)
In other words, generation reserve is paid the UMP at the bus
where it is located. If piu,km,t = 0, then the associated credit
is zero no matter what the value of ∆P ki,t is. Similar to the
uncertainties, the generation reserves can be in either upward
or downward direction. Denote the upward generation reserve
as Qupi,t and the downward generation reserve as Q
down
i,t
Qupi,t := min
{
Iˆi,tP
max
i − Pi,t, Rui (1− yˆi,t)
}
, (15)
Qdowni,t := max
{
Iˆi,tP
min
i − Pi,t, −Rdi (1− zˆi,t+1)
}
. (16)
We also have the following lemma regarding the relation
between Qupi,t, Q
down
i,t and ∆P
k
i,t.
5Lemma 2. If i ∈ G(m), then the optimal solution ∆P ki,t to
problem (RED) is
∆P ki,t =
{
Qupi,t, if pi
u,k
m,t > 0
Qdowni,t , if pi
u,k
m,t < 0
and
piu,km,t = β¯
k
i,t −
¯
βki,t + α¯
k
i,t − ¯α
k
i,t, (17)
Please check Appendix D-B for the proof. The credit to
generation reserve i located at bus m (14) can be rewritten as
(18) according to Lemma 2 and (11).
ΘGi,t = pi
u,up
m,tQ
up
i,t + pi
u,down
m,t Q
down
i,t (18)
(18) shows that the upward and downward generation reserves
are credited separately. Flexible resources may receive credits
for both the upward and downward generation reserves simul-
taneously. (18) always holds even if other uncertainty sets are
modeled in RUC.
D. Transmission Reserve and Revenue Adequacy
Some transmission capacities are reserved according to the
solution to (RED). These transmission reserves are used to
ensure the ramping deliverability when the uncertainty is
revealed, as shown in (7f) and (7g). It is noted that they
are determined automatically in (RED), and kept explicitly
without explicit transmission reserve requirement constraints.
Just like the “scheduled” generation reserve, the “scheduled”
transmission reserves in positive direction and negative direc-
tion are
∆f posl,t := Fl −
∑
m
Γl,mP
inj
m,t, (19)
∆f negl,t := Fl +
∑
m
Γl,mP
inj
m,t, (20)
respectively. They are always non-negative.
An important issue related to the transmission reserve is
the credit entitled to the Financial Transmission Right (FTR)
holders. FTR is a financial instrument used to hedge con-
gestion cost in the electricity market, where participants are
charged or credited due to the transmission congestion [21],
[25]. Within the robust framework, the effective transmission
capacity for base-case scenario is different from the physical
limit, which is used in the Simultaneous Feasibility Test (SFT)
for FTR market [18], [20], [21]. In the existing market, the
FTR credit is funded by the energy congestion cost, which
is the net payment of energy. However, the energy congestion
cost may not be sufficient to fund the FTR credit [18], [19]. We
argue that the transmission reserve becomes a new reason for
FTR underfunding in any framework to guarantee the ramping
deliverability.
Theorem 1. If transmission reserve ∆f posl,t and ∆f
neg
l,t are
kept for line l at time t in DAM, then the maximum FTR
underfunding associated with line l at time t is∑
k∈K
(
η¯kl,t∆f
pos
l,t +
¯
ηkl,t∆f
neg
l,t
)
(21)
due to the deficiency of energy congestion cost.
Uncertainty 
Payment
Energy 
Payment
Gen. Res. 
Credit
Trans. Res. 
Credit
Energy 
Credit
LMP Cong. Cost
FTR Credit
Fig. 1. Money flow of the proposed market clearing mechanism, where
uncertainty sources make the uncertainty payment, and LSEs make the energy
payment.
Please check Appendix D-C for the proof. From the FTR
holder’s point of view, (21) is the credit due to the transmission
reserve. Therefore, we also call (21) transmission reserve
credit, and denote it as
ΘTl,t :=
∑
k∈K
(
η¯kl,t∆f
pos
l,t +
¯
ηkl,t∆f
neg
l,t
)
. (22)
At most one of η¯kl,t and
¯
ηkl,t is non-zero for transmission l.
The credit to positive transmission reserve is zero for line l at
time t, when either
∑
k∈K η¯
k
l,t = 0 or ∆f
pos
l,t = 0.
Theorem 2. If (RED) is feasible, then uncertainty payment
can exactly cover generation reserve credit and transmission
reserve credit, and the revenue adequacy is always guaranteed
in the proposed market clearing mechanism.
Please check Appendix D-D for the proof. Theorem 1
reveals that FTR underfunding issue can occur within the
existing market structures as long as the transmission reserve
is non-zero, even if the LMPs are calculated based on other
approaches. Theorem 2 shows that the new market clear-
ing mechanism overcomes the FTR underfunding issue. The
money flow of the proposed market clearing mechanism is
depicted in Fig.1. Energy payment collected based on LMP
is distributed to FTR holders as LMP congestion cost and
generators as energy credit. On the other hand, the payment
collected based on UMP is distributed to FTR holders as
transmission reserve credit and flexible resources as generation
reserve credit. The LMP congestion cost and transmission
reserve credit can exactly cover the FTR credit, which is
calculated based on the LMP difference and FTR amount.
E. Market Equilibrium
In this section, we characterize the competitive market equi-
librium model. In the electricity industry, the partial market
equilibrium model is often employed [1], [13], [26], where
market participants are price takers [27].
The energy is cleared according to (6a). Uncertainty and
generation reserve are cleared according to (7a). Without loss
of generality, consider unit i located at bus m. Its profit
maximization problem can be formulated as
(PMPi)max
Pi,t
∑
t
(
Pi,tpi
e
m,t + pi
u,up
m,tQ
up
i,t + pi
u,down
m,t Q
down
i,t
−CPi (Pi,t)
)
s.t. (6b)− (6e), (15)− (16)
6where the decision variable is Pi,t given the price signal
(piem,t, pi
u,up
m,t , pi
u,down
m,t ). As proved in Appendix D-E, unit i
is not inclined to change its power output level as it can
obtain the maximum profit by following the ISO’s dispatch
instruction Pˆi,t. Price signal piem,t provides the incentives for
unit i to dispatch power output to Pˆi,t, and price pi
u,k
m,t gives
incentives for unit i to maintain the generation reserve for
uncertainty. Hence, the dispatch instruction Pˆi,t and price
signal (piem,t, pi
u,up
m,t , pi
u,down
m,t ) constitute a competitive partial
equilibrium [27].
F. Discussions
As the Pi,t and ∆P ki,t (or (Q
up
i,t, Q
down
i,t )) are coupled by
(7b) and (7c), the opportunity cost (β¯ki,t −
¯
βki,t) is enough to
provide the incentives for i to keep the generation level at Pˆi,t.
Including α¯ki,t−¯α
k
i,t in the generation reserve price has several
benefits. Firstly, generation reserves provided by different units
are priced fairly. Generation reserve prices are the same for the
units at the same bus, and they may vary with locations if line
congestions exist. Secondly, higher generation reserve price
attracts long-term investment for flexible resources. Thirdly, it
is consistent with the existing reserve pricing practice [2], [28].
In fact, generation reserve price is consistent with the UMP.
Therefore, the uncertainties and flexibilities are also treated
fairly at the same bus.
The upward and downward UMPs are obtained according to
(11), respectively. The uncertainty sources are charged accord-
ing to (13). The generation reserves are credited according to
(18). The price signal piu,km,t defined in (9) and re-dispatch ∆P
k
i,t
are intermediate variables for market clearing. The proposed
UMP may be non-zero even if the uncertainty at a bus is zero.
This is similar to the LMP, which may also be non-zero for
the bus without load.
The market clearing mechanism proposed in this paper
follows the cost causation principle for the cost allocation.
In reality, it may be controversial to allocate the reserve cost
to uncertainty sources. However, we argue that it would be fair
and must be done when the RES penetration level is high. An
extreme case is when the loads are all supplied by RES. There
has been study showing it is possible that the increasing RES
penetration can cause higher system operation cost. This issue
cannot be handled by the existing market clearing mechanism,
in which loads pay for the additional system reserve that is
required to accommodate the uncertainty from RES. In other
words, loads are actually providing subsidies to RES. When
the RES penetration level is low, the subsidies can help the
growth of the RES. However, when the RES penetration level
is high, these growing subsidies will cause serious fairness
issue. On the other hand, with UMP as the stimulating price
signals, RES will have the incentives to improve its forecast
techniques and reduce its uncertainty. In the ideal case when
its uncertainty approaches zero, RES will no longer pay.
Following the existing practice, the UC variables are fixed
during the marginal price derivation. Hence, the uplift issue,
which exists in the real market, still remains in the proposed
market clearing mechanism. Although the UC variables are
fixed, the LMP and reserve price in the real market can provide
effective signals for the long-term investment of generation
and transmission as well as consumption strategy of electricity.
Similarly, the uncertainty impact is not only reflected in UC,
but also in the ED within the RUC model in this paper.
Hence, the proposed LMP and UMP can also provide signals
for the long-term investment of flexibilities (i.e. generation,
transmission, and demand).
The pricing for uncertainties proposed in this paper is not
in conflict with the pricing for traditional reserves, which
are mainly prepared for the contingencies. The traditional
reserve prices can be derived in the framework by adding extra
traditional reserve constraints, and the corresponding reserve
costs can still be allocated to LSEs.
It is observed that the credit in (14) is the sum of credits for
all extreme points. That is because the related constraints may
be binding for multiple extreme points, and the dual variables
(shadow prices) for these constraints work together in the dual
problem. The traditional price for energy and reserve also has
similar form when multiple contingencies are modeled.
Although only one scenario will happen in reality, we still
need to consider the worst scenario defined in uncertainty set
and keep enough reserves in DAM. That is because DAM is
a financial market, and the LMP and UMP are the financially
binding prices. This is similar to the existing market model
considering contingencies. Even if the contingency seldom
occurs, they are still modeled for market clearing, and the
contingencies are reflected in LMP and reserve price.
The issue of price multiplicity still exists in the proposed
model [29] because problem (RED) is a linear programming
(LP) problem. However, the price is unique with the nonde-
generacy assumption. For simplicity, we have considered a
single-sided auction in the proposed model. By introducing
the demand bids, we can formulate a double-sided auction
and the general principles in this paper will still apply.
III. CASE STUDY
A six-bus system and the IEEE 118-Bus system are sim-
ulated to illustrate the proposed market clearing mechanism.
In the six-bus system, the basic ideas of UMP are presented
within the robust optimization framework. FTR underfunding
issue is illustrated and a comparison between the UMP and
traditional reserve price are presented. In the IEEE 118-Bus
system, the UMP related products are presented for different
uncertainty levels. The behaviors and impacts of flexible
sources are analyzed by an energy storage example.
A. Six-bus System
A six-bus system is studied in this section. The one-line
diagram is shown in Fig. 2. The unit data and line data
are shown in Table I and Table II, respectively. Table III
presents the load and uncertainty information. Column “Base
Load” shows the hourly forecasted load. Assume that the load
distributions are 20%, 40%, and 40% for Bus 3, Bus 4, and
Bus 5, respectively. u¯1,t and u¯3,t in Table III are the bounds
of the uncertainties at Bus 1 and Bus 3, respectively. The
uncertainty bounds at other buses are 0.
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Fig. 2. One-line diagram for 6-bus system.
TABLE I
UNIT DATA FOR THE 6-BUS SYSTEM
# Pmin Pmax P0 a b c Ru Rd Cu Cd T on T off T0
1 100 220 120 0.004 13.5 176.9 24 24 180 50 4 4 4
2 10 100 50 0.001 32.6 129.9 12 12 360 40 3 2 3
6 10 20 0 0.005 17.6 137.4 5 5 60 0 1 1 −2
Pmin,Pmax,P0: min/max/initial generation level (MW);
fuel cost ($): aP 2 + bP + c ;
Ru,Rd: ramping up/down rate (MW/h);
Cu,Cd: startup/shutdown cost ($);
T on,T off,T0: min on/min off/initial time (h)
It is assumed that the relative forecasting errors increase
with hours. Uncertainty 1,t and 3,t also respect
−Λ · u¯m,t ≤ m,t ≤ Λ · u¯m,t,∀t,m (23a)∑
m
|m,t|
u¯m,t
≤ Λ∆,∀t, (23b)
where (23a) denotes the uncertainty interval at a single bus,
and (23b) represents the system-wide uncertainty [5]. The Λ
and Λ∆ are the budget parameters for the single bus and
system, respectively.
1) LMP and UMP: Consider the case where Λ = 1,Λ∆ =
2. The CCG based approach converges after 2 iterations.
TABLE II
LINE DATA FOR THE 6-BUS SYSTEM
from 1 1 2 5 3 2 4
to 2 4 4 6 6 3 5
x(p.u.) 0.17 0.258 0.197 0.14 0.018 0.037 0.037
capacity(MW) 200 100 100 100 100 200 200
TABLE III
LOAD AND UNCERTAINTY DATA FOR THE 6-BUS SYSTEM (MW)
Time (h) Base Load u¯1,t u¯3,t Time (h) Base Load u¯1,t u¯3,t
1 175.19 1.09 0.29 13 242.18 19.68 5.25
2 165.15 2.06 0.55 14 243.6 21.32 5.68
3 158.67 2.98 0.79 15 248.86 23.33 6.22
4 154.73 3.87 1.03 16 255.79 25.58 6.82
5 155.06 4.85 1.29 17 256 27.2 7.25
6 160.48 6.02 1.6 18 246.74 27.76 7.4
7 173.39 7.59 2.02 19 245.97 29.21 7.79
8 177.6 8.88 2.37 20 237.35 29.67 7.91
9 186.81 10.51 2.8 21 237.31 31.15 8.31
10 206.96 12.94 3.45 22 232.67 31.99 8.53
11 228.61 15.72 4.19 23 195.93 28.16 7.51
12 236.1 17.71 4.72 24 195.6 29.34 7.82
TABLE IV
MARGINAL COSTS AT DIFFERENT GENERATION LEVELS ($/MWH)
Gen. 1 Gen. 2 Gen. 3
¯
Pw1 P¯
w
1 mar. cost ¯
Pw2 P¯
w
2 mar. cost ¯
Pw3 P¯
w
3 mar. cost
100 124 14.396 10 28 32.638 10 12 17.71
124 148 14.588 28 46 32.674 12 14 17.73
148 172 14.78 46 64 32.71 14 16 17.75
172 196 14.972 64 82 32.746 16 18 17.77
196 220 15.164 82 100 32.782 18 20 17.79
TABLE V
GENERATION AND RESERVE (Λ = 1,Λ∆ = 2, MW)
T P1 P2 P3 Q
up
1 Q
down
1 Q
up
2 Q
down
2 Q
up
3 Q
down
3
21 195.19 25.58 16.54 24 −24 12 −12 3.46 −5
Hence, K = {1, 2}. Given the UC solutions, the problem
(RED) can be solved by commercial LP solver. The marginal
prices are then obtained as byproducts.
The generation outputs are presented in Table V at Hours 21.
It can be observed that G1 supplies most of the loads at Hour
21, which is 195.19 MW. According to the bid information in
Table IV, G2 is much more expensive than G1 and G3. Hence,
the output of G2 is relatively small and at the low level of
its capacity. The upward and downward generation reserves
provided by the three units are also listed in Table V. These
data can be obtained directly from Eqs. (15) and (16) given
the generation output Pi,t. Although the remaining generation
capacity of G1 is 220 − 195.19 = 24.62 MW, the upward
reserve is limited by its upward ramping rate 24 MW. In the
meantime, the upward reserve provided by G3 is limited by its
generation capacity although it has more remaining ramping
capacity (i.e. min{20− 16.54, 5} = 3.46 MW).
Table VI shows the extreme points obtained in the CCG-
based approach. The intermediate price signals for these points
piu,km,t are also presented. It can be observed that the worst point
is always obtained at the extreme point of the uncertainty set.
For example, at Hour 21, the ˆ11,1 is 31.15 MW. It is exactly the
upper bound of the uncertainty at Hour 21 at Bus 1. The data
in Table VI also verifies Lemma 1. The intermediate UMPs
piu,km,t have the same sign as the uncertainties ˆ
k
m,t at the same
bus.
The LMPs, aggregated upward UMPs, and aggregated
downward UMPs at Hour 21 are shown in Table VII. It is
noted that UMPs still exist at buses without uncertainties (i.e.,
Buses 2,4,5,6). This is similar to LMPs, which also exist
at buses where net power injections are 0. The LMPs vary
with locations, which indicates that the line congestion exists.
TABLE VI
EXTREME POINTS OF UNCERTAINTY SET
k = 1 k = 2
t ˆ11,t ˆ
1
3,t pi
u,1
1,t pi
u,1
3,t ˆ
2
1,t ˆ
2
3,t pi
u,2
1,t pi
u,2
3,t
21 31.15 8.31 14.87 14.87 −31.15 8.31 −17.67 1.77
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LMP AND UMP AT HOUR 21 (Λ = 1,Λ∆ = 2)
Price Bus1 Bus2 Bus3 Bus4 Bus5 Bus6
pie 14.97 32.64 34.4 43.71 41.94 35.26
piu,up 14.87 14.87 16.63 25.94 24.17 17.49
piu,down -17.67 0 0 0 0 0
The load at Bus 4 has to pay the highest LMP $43.71/MWh.
The UMPs are also different at various locations. The highest
upward UMP at Hour 21 is also located at Bus 4. With these
prices, the market participants can be paid and credited.
The LMP paid to G3 is $35.26/MWh on Bus 6, which
is $17.49/MWh larger than its marginal cost. In the same
time, The upward UMP is $17.49/MWh on Bus 6, which is
exactly the difference between the LMP and G3’s marginal
cost. Hence, G3 is the UMP setter on Bus 6. The UMPs
provide important price signals on the planning of renewable
energy sources and storages. For example, the UMP at Bus 2 is
relatively small, so it is an ideal location for renewable energy
sources in terms of payment for uncertainties. In contrast,
the UMP at Bus 4 is large, which may attract the long-term
investment for storages or generation plants with large ramping
rates.
2) Comparison with Existing LMPs and Reserve Prices:
The motivation of this part is to compare the proposed clearing
scheme with the existing one. However, as the reserve is not
robust in the traditional scheme, we cannot compare them
fairly. With the observation that the transmission constraints
are the most challenging one in the robust UC framework,
we drop these constraints in this subsection and add reserve
constraints as follows.
Ii,tP
min
i ≤ Qdowni,t + Pi,t, Qupi,t + Pi,t ≤ Ii,tPmaxi ,∀i, t (24a)
−Rdi Ii,t∆T ≤ Qdowni,t , Qupi,t ≤ Rui Ii,t∆T, ∀i, t (24b)∑
i
Qdowni,t ≤ ¯Rt,
∑
i
Qupi,t ≥ R¯t,∀t, (24c)
where Qupi,t and Q
down
i,t are the largest upward and downward
reserves, respectively.
¯
Rt and R¯t are system-wide reserve
requirements. Refer to [2], [30] for more details on the
reserve formulations. In the experiment, ∆T is set to 1 and
Λ = 0.8,Λ∆ = 2. The reserve requirements
¯
Rt and R¯t are set
to the lower and upper bounds of the system-wide uncertainty
in (23b), respectively.
The results are as expected. The optimal solutions of the
RUC and the standard UC with explicit reserve constraints are
the same. LMPs calculated in the RUC and UC also have the
same values. The UMPs calculated in the proposed mechanism
are also exactly the same as the reserve prices in standard
UC. Two things are verified with these results. First, without
transmission constraints, the solution to standard UC can easily
be robust by adding reserve constraints. Second, the proposed
LMPs and UMPs are consistent with LMPs and reserve prices
in the existing market when the transmission constraints are
dropped.
When considering transmission constraints, the generation
reserve cannot be guaranteed at bus levels in the traditional
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Fig. 3. Upward UMP (blue bar) and reserve price (red bar) with network
constraint.
UC model. For simplicity, we assume that the 6 buses are
in a zone. Consider the case where Λ = 0.8,Λ∆ = 2. The
upward UMP and reserve price at Hour 20 are depicted in
Fig. 3a. It is observed UMPs at Bus 1 and Bus 2 are lower
than the traditional reserve prices. In the same time, the UMPs
at Bus 4 and Bus 5 is higher than the traditional reserve
prices. The differences are caused by the congestion of Line
1-4 for reserve delivery. It is worth mentioning that the LMP
differences in two models are within 1% at Hour 20. The
prices illustrated in Fig. 3b reveals another trends that the
UMP may be higher than the traditional reserve prices. At
Hour 21, the zonal reserve price is 0 while the UMPs are non-
zeros at bus 4, 5, and 6. Because the constraint related with
reserves in the RUC is stronger than the one in traditional UC
model. Consequently, more expensive resources are used in
RUC, which also generally leads to higher UMPs.
3) FTR Underfunding: When Λ∆ = 2,Λ = 1, the gen-
eration schedules at Hour 21 are 195.193MW, 25.577MW,
and 16.54MW. The power flow of Line 2 is 97.63MW,
which is 2.47MW smaller than its physical limit of 100MW.
The transmission reserve 2.47 MW is kept to guarantee
the delivery of the generation reserve. The binding con-
straint for Line 2 causes LMP differences. Hence, the
FTR holder gets credits. Consider a set of FTR amounts
[202.3429, 23.2771,−55.772,−94.924,−94.924, 20]. It can
be verified that the FTR amounts satisfy the SFT in the FTR
market. Then the total credit for the FTR holders is $5,554.77.
However, the congestion cost in the DAM is $5,422.87. It
means that the LMP congestion cost collected is not enough
to cover the FTR credit. The FTR underfunding value is
$5554.77− $5422.87 = $131.90.
The revenue residues after UMP settlement is $131.9. It ex-
actly covers the FTR underfunding in this scenario. Therefore,
the revenue is adequate at Hour 21.
B. IEEE 118-Bus System
The simulations are performed for the IEEE 118-bus system
with 54 thermal units and 186 branches in this section. The
peak load is 6600MW. The detailed data including generator
parameters, line reactance and ratings, and load profiles can be
found at http://motor.ece.iit.edu/Data/RUC118UMP.xls. Two
cases are studied in this section.
1) The uncertainty levels and load levels are changed to
analyze the simulation results in the system level. The
impact of transmission line capacity on prices is also
studied.
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OPERATION COST AND UMP PAYMENT ($,Λ∆ = 10)
Λ Op. Cost Un. Payment Gen. Res. Credit Rev. Res.
0.2 1,866,023 11,043 10,560 483
0.25 1,871,364 20,044 19,209 835
0.3 1,877,471 30,879 28,658 2,221
2) An energy storage is installed at a specified bus with
high UMP to show the potential application of UMPs.
1) Case 1: We assume that the uncertainty sources are lo-
cated at buses (11, 15, 49, 54, 56, 59, 60, 62, 80, 90). The bud-
get parameter Λ∆ is set to 10 in this section. The bus-
level uncertainty budget parameter Λ changes from 0.2 to
0.3, and the bound of the uncertainty is the base load. The
simulation results are shown in Table VIII. It can be observed
that the total operation cost increases with increasing Λ. It
indicates that a larger uncertainty level may increase the
operation cost. The columns “Un. Payment” and “Gen. Res.
Credit” denote the total payment from uncertainty sources and
credit to generation reserves, respectively. The lowest payment
is $11,043 and the highest one is $30,879. On the other
hand, the credit entitled to the generation reserves is also a
monotonically increasing function of Λ. When Λ = 0.3, the
generation reserves have the highest credit. The last column
“Rev. Res.” shows that the revenue residues related to UMPs.
It can be observed that the residue is always positive.
Fig. 4a in the next page depicts the heat map for the
upward UMPs from Bus 80 to Bus 100 in 24 hours. The x-
axis represents time intervals and the y-axis represents bus
numbers. The color bar on the right shows different colors for
various UMP values. For example, the $0/MWh is denoted by
the blue color at the bottom, and the $18/MWh is represented
by the dark red color on the top of the color bar. It can be
observed that the uncertainty sources have system-wide unique
UMPs at some intervals, such as Hours 8, 13, 15, and so on. It
indicates that there is no transmission reserve in these hours.
On the other hand, the UMPs at Hour 11 vary dramatically
with different locations. The highest upward UMP is around
$18/MWh, and the lowest one is around $2/MWh. According
to the data shown in Fig. 4a, the high UMP at Bus 94
may attract investment of flexible resources, such as energy
storages, in terms of generation reserve credit, and Bus 100 is
an attractive location for the investment of renewable energy
sources in terms of uncertainty payments.
Fig. 5 shows the uncertainty payment and generation reserve
credit with respect to load levels. The base load level is set
at 100%. Higher loads in general lead to more uncertainty
payments and generation reserve credits. It is also consistent
with the heat map of UMPs in Fig. 4a, where UMPs at peak
load hours are high. It suggests that the generation reserves
also become scarce resources when load levels are high.
The transmission line capacity plays an important role in the
price calculation. Fig. 6 shows the LMPs and upward UMPs
at Hour 11 with respect to increasing capacity of Line 94-
100. The prices at Buses 88, 94, and 100 are depicted. When
the line capacity increases from 165MW to 175MW, LMP at
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increasing capacity of Line 94-100
Bus 94 decreases from $47.92/MWh to $35.84/MWh and that
at Bus 88 also drops to $30.58/MWh from $38.78/MWh. The
upward UMPs at Bus 94 and Bus 88 also drop by $8.20/MWh
and $12.08/MWh, respectively. In contrast, the LMP and
upward UMP at Bus 100, which is connected to Line 94-100,
remain at $19.42/MWh and $1.64/MWh, respectively. It shows
that the change of line capacity may only have impacts on the
prices at some buses. When the line capacity further increases
to 185MW from 175MW, the changes of LMPs and UMPs at
Bus 94 and Bus 88 are within $0.1/MWh, and there is still no
change at Bus 100. It means that the additional 10MW cannot
help deliver cheaper energy and reserves to Bus 94 and Bus
88. These results are also consistent with the analysis of the
traditional LMPs [31].
2) Case 2: As discussed in Case 1, the upward UMP on
Bus 94 is high at Hour 11. Assume that an energy storage
(8MW/30MWh) is installed at Bus 94. A simple model for
the energy storage is formulated as follows.
Et = Et−1 + ρdPDt + ρ
cPCt ,∀t
0 ≤ Et ≤ Emax,∀t
0 ≤ −PDt ≤ IDt RD,∀t
0 ≤ PCt ≤ ICt RC ,∀t
IDt + I
C
t ≤ 1,∀t
ENT = E0,
where Et denotes the energy level, PDt and P
C
t represent
the discharging and charging rates, and IDt and I
C
t are the
indicators of discharging and charging. As the UMP is the
major concern in this section, we use simplified parameters for
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Fig. 4. Heat Map for Upward UMPs (Λ = 0.3). Different colors represent various UMPs. Figure (a) depicts the UMPs from Bus 80 to Bus 100 in 24 hours
without the energy storage at Bus 94. Figure (b) depicts the new UMPs after the energy storage is sited at Bus 94.
storage. The discharging efficiency ρd and charging efficiency
ρc are set to 100%. The capacity Emax and initial energy
level E0 are set to 30 MWh and 15 MWh, respectively. The
maximal charging rate RD and discharging rate RC are set to
8 MW/h.
By siting the energy storage, we can lower the new operation
cost to $1,875,211 from $1,877,471. The payment collected
from the uncertainty sources becomes $27,473, and the credit
to generation reserves decreases to $24,289. Compared to the
data in Table VIII, the energy storage also helps to reduce the
payment related to UMPs. The storage is entitled to $1326
generation reserve credit. Fig. 4b depicts the new upward
UMPs after the installation of the energy storage. Compared
to that in Fig. 4a, the upward UMP for Hour 11 at Bus 94
decreases a lot. The UMPs for Hour 10 and 12 are also lower.
It suggests that sitting the energy storage at Bus 94 effectively
lower the generation reserve price.
The simulation results demonstrate that flexible resources
can lower the UMPs, and UMPs provide the investment signal
at locations where generation reserves are scarce resources.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
A novel market model in this paper clears uncertainty,
energy, and generation reserve simultaneously within the RUC
framework in DAM. The uncertainty sources are charged
and the generator reserve providers are credited based on
the proposed UMP. The UMP formulation is derived within
a robust optimization framework. We also characterize the
market equilibrium for the new market clearing mechanism.
As the market clearing mechanism is established within the
robust optimization framework, the robustness of the dispatch
is guaranteed. The optimal reserves for uncertainty accommo-
dation are obtained in the model. The UMP proposed in this
paper can effectively address the issue on how to charge and
credit the uncertainties and generation reserve fairly in the
market with RES.
Our study also shows that traditional pricing mechanism
within RUC framework may lead to FTR underfunding. The
proposed market clearing mechanism can address this issue.
Our study shows load serving entities can have lower energy
prices within the new market scheme, as the reserve fees are
paid by uncertainty sources.
Many potential applications on UMPs are open. As UMPs
are unified prices of uncertainties and reserves, it is interesting
to investigate the optimal strategy for the one who is the
uncertainty source as well as reserve provider in the market
(e.g. the wind generation company with energy storages). The
UMPs derived in this paper also provide an important price
signal for the long-term investment of flexible resources. When
the upward UMP or downward UMP at a bus is high, the
investor can get more return in terms of generation reserves.
Another potential future research on UMP is to study how to
determine the budget uncertainty set in the market. Modeling
the traditional spinning reserve for the contingency [13], [30]
is also our future work. In this paper, the demand bids are
not considered. We have forecasted load, forecasted RES, and
uncertainty of load and RES for market clearing with a single-
sided model. In an extended double-sided model, we can have
demand bids, forecasted RES, and uncertainty of load and
RES for market clearing. The forecasted load, forecasted RES,
uncertainty of load and RES can be used in RAC.
APPENDIX A
DETAILED FORMULATION FOR PROBLEM (RUC)
(RUC) min
(x,y,z,I,P )∈F
∑
t
∑
i
(
CPi (Pi,t) + C
I
i (Ii,t)
)
(25a)
s.t.
∑
i
Pi,t =
∑
m
dm,t,∀t. (25b)
−Fl ≤
∑
m
Γl,m
 ∑
i∈G(m)
Pi,t − dm,t
 ≤ Fl,∀l, t (25c)
Ii,tP
min
i ≤ Pi,t ≤ Ii,tPmaxi ,∀i, t (26a)
Pi,t − Pi,(t−1) ≤ rui (1− yi,t) + Pmini yi,t,∀i, t (26b)
−Pi,t + Pi,(t−1) ≤ rdi (1− zi,t) + Pmini zi,t,∀i, t (26c)
minimum on/off time limit
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and
F :=
{
(x, y, z, I, P ) : ∀ ∈ U ,∃∆P such that∑
i
∆Pi,t =
∑
m
m,t,∀t, (27a)
Ii,tP
min
i ≤ Pi,t + ∆Pi,t ≤ Ii,tPmaxi ,∀i, t (27b)
−Rdi (1− zi,t+1) ≤ ∆Pi,t ≤ Rui (1− yi,t),∀i, t (27c)
∆P injm,t =
∑
i∈G(m)
∆Pi,t − m,t,∀m, t (27d)
−Fl ≤
∑
m
Γl,m(P
inj
m,t + ∆P
inj
m,j) ≤ Fl, ,∀l, t
}
. (27e)
The basic idea of the above model is to find a robust UC and
dispatch for the base-case scenario. In the base-case scenario,
(25b) denotes the load balance constraint; (25c) represents the
transmission line constraint; (26a) denotes the unit capacity
limit constraint; (26b)-(26c) denote the unit ramping up/down
limits. Ii,t, yi,t, and zi,t are the indicators of the unit being
on, started-up, and shutdown, respectively. Units also respect
the minimum on/off time constraints which are related to
these binary variables [1]. The UC and dispatch solution are
immunized against any uncertainty  ∈ U . When uncertainty 
occurs, it is accommodated by the generation adjustment ∆Pi,t
(27a). Generation dispatch is also enforced by the capacity
limits (27b). (27c) models the ramping rate limits of generation
adjustment ∆Pi,t. In fact, the right and left hand sides of (27c)
can correspond to a response time ∆T , which is similar to the
10-min or 30-min reserves in the literatures [30]. (27e) stands
for the network constraint after uncertainty accommodation.
APPENDIX B
DETAILED FORMULATION FOR PROBLEM (MP) AND (SP)
(MP) min
(x,y,z,I,P,∆P )
∑
t
∑
i
(
CPi (Pi,t) + C
I
i (Ii,t)
)
S.T. (25b), (25c), (26a)-(26c), minimum on/off time limit∑
i
∆P ki,t =
∑
m
km,t,∀t,∀k ∈ K (28a)
Ii,tP
min
i ≤ Pi,t + ∆P ki,t ≤ Ii,tPmaxi ,∀i, t,∀k ∈ K (28b)
∆P ki,t ≤ Rui (1− yi,t),∀i, t,∀k ∈ K (28c)
−∆P ki,t ≤ Rdi (1− zi,t+1),∀i, t,∀k ∈ K (28d)
−Fl ≤
∑
m
Γl,m(P
inj
m,t + ∆P
inj,k
m,t ) ≤ Fl,∀k ∈ K,∀l, t (28e)
∆P inj,km,t =
∑
i∈G(m)
∆P ki,t − km,t,∀m, t,∀k ∈ K, (28f)
and
(SP) max
∈U
min
(s+,s−,∆P )∈R()
∑
m
∑
t
(s+m,t + s
−
m,t) (29a)
R():=
{
(s+, s−,∆P ) : (29b)∑
i
∆Pi,t =
∑
m
(m,t + s
+
m,t − s−m,t),∀m, t (29c)
−Fl ≤
∑
m
Γl,m
(
P injm,t + ∆P
inj
m,t
)
≤ Fl,∀l, t (29d)
∆P injm,t =
∑
i∈G(m)
∆Pi,t − (m,t + s+m,t − s−m,t)(29e)
s+m,t, s
−
m,t ≥ 0,∀m, t (29f)
(27b), (27c)
}
where K is the index set for uncertainty points ˆ which are
dynamically generated in (SP) with iterations. It should be
noted that ˆk is the extreme point of U . Variable ∆P ki,t is
associated with ˆk. The objective function in (SP) is the
summation of non-negative slack variables s+m,t and s
−
m,t,
which evaluates the violation associated with the solution
(x, y, z, I, P ) from (MP). s+m,t and s
−
m,t are also explained as
un-followed uncertainties (generation or load shedding) due to
system limitations.
APPENDIX C
LAGRANGIAN FUNCTION FOR PROBLEM (RED)
Please check equation (30) in the next page.
APPENDIX D
PROOFS FOR LEMMAS AND THEOREMS
A. Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Consider ˆkm,t > 0, pi
u,k
m,t < 0. With a small perturbation
δ > 0 to ˆkm,t, we replace ˆ
k
m,t with ˆ
k
m,t − δ in (RED).
As the piu,km,t < 0 , then the optimal value to problem
(RED) increases. It means that there are violations for the
original optimal solution Pi,t to problem (RED) with ˆkm,t−δ.
Hence, the optimal solution Pi,t to problem (RED) cannot be
immunized against the uncertainty ˆkm,t−δ. It contradicts with
the robustness of the solution Pi,t. Therefore, if ˆkm,t > 0, then
piu,km,t ≥ 0. Similarly, if ˆkm,t < 0, then piu,km,t ≤ 0.
B. Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. Assume i ∈ G(m), according to the KKT condition
∂L(P,∆P, λ, α, β, η)
∂∆P ki,t
= 0 (31)
at the optimal point, we have
β¯ki,t−
¯
βki,t + α¯
k
i,t− ¯α
k
i,t−λkt +
∑
l
(η¯kl,t−
¯
ηkl,t)Γl,m = 0. (32)
Then (17) holds. If piu,km,t > 0, then β¯
k
i,t + α¯
k
i,t > 0 as
β¯ki,t,
¯
βki,t, α¯
k
i,t, and ¯
αki,t are non-negative. According to the
complementary conditions for (7b) and (7d), at least one of
(7b) and (7d) is binding. Hence,
∆P ki,t = min
{
Iˆi,tP
max
i − Pi,t, Rui (1− yˆi,t)
}
holds. Similarly, the other equation holds when piu,km,t < 0.
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L(P,∆P, λ, α, β, η)
=
∑
t
∑
i
CPi (Pi,t) +
∑
t
λt
(∑
m
dm,t −
∑
i
Pi,t
)
+
∑
t
∑
i
(
β¯i,t(Pi,t − Iˆi,tPmaxi ) +
¯
βi,t(Iˆi,tP
min
i − Pi,t)
)
+
∑
t
∑
i
(
α¯i,t
(
Pi,t − Pi,t−1 − rui (1− yˆi,t)− Pmini,t yˆi,t
)
+
¯
αi,t
(
Pi,t−1 − Pi,t − rdi (1− zˆi,t)− Pmini,t yˆi,t
))
+
∑
t
∑
l
(
η¯l,t
(∑
m
Γl,mP
inj
m,t − Fl
)
−
¯
ηl,t
(∑
m
Γl,mP
inj
m,t + Fl
))
+
∑
k∈K
∑
t
λkt
(∑
m
km,t −
∑
i
∆P ki,t
)
+
∑
k∈K
∑
t
∑
i
(
β¯ki,t(Pi,t + ∆P
k
i,t − Iˆi,tPmaxi ) +
¯
βki,t(Iˆi,tP
min
i − Pi,t −∆P ki,t)
)
+
∑
k∈K
∑
t
∑
i
(
α¯ki,t
(
∆P ki,t −Rui (1− yˆi,t)
)
−
¯
αki,t
(
∆P ki,t +R
d
i (1− zˆi,t)
))
+
∑
k∈K
∑
t
∑
l
(
η¯kl,t
(∑
m
Γl,m(P
inj
m,t + ∆P
inj,k
m,t )− Fl
)
−
¯
ηkl,t
(∑
m
Γl,m(P
inj
m,t + ∆P
inj,k
m,t ) + Fl
))
(30)
C. Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. The energy congestion cost at t is∑
m
(
piem,tdm,t −
∑
i∈G(m)
piem,tPi,t
)
(33)
=
∑
m
piem,tP
inj
m,t
=
∑
m
∑
l
Γl,m
(
η¯l,t +
∑
k∈K
η¯kl,t −
¯
ηl,t −
∑
k∈K¯
ηkl,t
)
P injm,t
=
∑
l
(
η¯l,t +
∑
k∈K
η¯kl,t
)(
Fl −∆f posl,t
)
−
∑
l
(
¯
ηl,t +
∑
k∈K¯
ηkl,t
)(
∆f negl,t − Fl
)
=
∑
l
(
η¯l,t +
∑
k∈K
η¯kl,t +
¯
ηl,t +
∑
k∈K¯
ηkl,t
)
Fl
−
∑
l
∑
k∈K
(
η¯kl,t∆f
pos
l,t +
¯
ηkl,t∆f
neg
l,t
)
−
∑
l
(
η¯l,t∆f
pos
l,t +
¯
ηl,t∆f
neg
l,t
)
=
∑
l
(
η¯l,t +
∑
k∈K
η¯kl,t +
¯
ηl,t +
∑
k∈K¯
ηkl,t
)
Fl
−
∑
l
∑
k∈K
(
η¯kl,t∆f
pos
l,t +
¯
ηkl,t∆f
neg
l,t
)
The first equality holds following the definition of net power
injection. The second equality holds according to (8) and∑
m P
inj
m,t = 0. The third equality holds following (19) and
(20). The sign change of
¯
ηl,t and
∑
l
¯
ηkl,t in the third equality
is because of the definition of power flow direction. According
to the complementary conditions, the third term in the fourth
equality must be zero based on the following three cases.
1) If η¯l,t 6= 0, then ∆f posl,t = 0, and
¯
ηl,t = 0.
2) If η¯l,t = 0 and
¯
ηl,t 6= 0, then ∆f negl,t = 0.
3) η¯l,t = 0 and
¯
ηl,t = 0.
The second term in the last equality corresponds to (21).
The credits to FTR holders can be written as∑
(m→n)
(piem,t − pien,t)FTRm→n (34)
=
∑
(m→n)

λt −
∑
l
Γl,m(η¯l,t −
¯
ηl,t)
−
∑
l
∑
k∈K
Γl,m(η¯
k
l,t −
¯
ηkl,t)
−λt +
∑
l
Γl,n(η¯l,t −
¯
ηl,t)
+
∑
l
∑
k∈K
Γl,n(η¯
k
l,t −
¯
ηkl,t)

FTRm→n
=
∑
(m→n)
∑
l

(Γl,n − Γl,m)(η¯l,t +
∑
k∈K
η¯kl,t)
−(Γl,n − Γl,m)(
¯
ηl,t +
∑
k∈K¯
ηkl,t)
FTRm→n
≤
∑
l
(
η¯l,t +
∑
k∈K
η¯kl,t +
¯
ηl,t +
∑
k∈K¯
ηkl,t
)
Fl
The first equality holds according to (8). The inequality is true
as the amount of FTRm→n respects
−Fl ≤
∑
m→n
(Γl,m − Γl,n)FTRm→n ≤ Fl.
according to the SFT for FTR market [18], [20], [21]. The
right-hand-side of the inequality is the first term in the last
equality of (33). Based on (33) and (34), the maximum
difference between the FTR credit and the energy congestion
cost is equal to the transmission reserve credit. That is, the
maximum FTR underfunding is (21).
D. Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. According to Theorem 1, the FTR underfunding value
is (21) due to the deficiency of the energy congestion cost.
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Therefore, we need to prove that the money collected from
uncertainty sources can cover the FTR underfunding and
credits to generation reserve.
Without loss of generality, we consider the payment col-
lected from uncertainty sources at time t for ˆk∑
m
piu,km,tˆ
k
m,t
=
∑
m
(
λkt −
∑
l
Γl,m
(
η¯kl,t −
¯
ηkl,t
) )
ˆkm,t
=
∑
i
∆P ki,tλ
k
t −
∑
m
∑
l
Γl,m
(
η¯kl,t −
¯
ηkl,t
)
(
∑
i∈G(m)
∆P ki,t)
+
∑
l
(
η¯kl,t∆f
pos
l,t +
¯
ηkl,t∆f
neg
l,t
)
=
∑
m
∑
i∈G(m)
piu,km,t∆P
k
i,t +
∑
l
(
η¯kl,t∆f
pos
l,t +
¯
ηkl,t∆f
neg
l,t
)
=
∑
i
piu,kmi,t∆P
k
i,t +
∑
l
(
η¯kl,t∆f
pos
l,t +
¯
ηkl,t∆f
neg
l,t
)
The first equality holds according to (9). According to (7a),
(7f), and (7g), the
∑
m
∑
l Γl,mη¯
k
l,tˆ
k
m,t in the second line can
be rewritten as∑
m
∑
l
Γl,mη¯
k
l,t
( ∑
i∈G(m)
(∆P ki,t + Pi,t)− dm,t
)
−
∑
l
η¯kl,tFl
=
∑
m
∑
l
Γl,mη¯
k
l,t
∑
i∈G(m)
∆P ki,t +
∑
l
η¯kl,t
(∑
m
Γl,mP
inj
m,t − Fl
)
=
∑
m
∑
l
Γl,mη¯
k
l,t(
∑
i∈G(m)
∆P ki,t)−
∑
l
η¯kl,t∆f
pos
l,t
∑
m
∑
l Γl,m
¯
ηkl,tˆ
k
m,t can be reformulated similarly. Hence,
the second equality holds. The third equality holds from (9).
Therefore,∑
m
∑
t
Ψm,t =
∑
i
∑
t
ΘGi,t +
∑
l
∑
t
ΘTl,t
holds. That is, the uncertainty payment covers the generation
reserve credit and transmission reserve credit. Then, following
the energy congestion cost shown in (33),∑
m
∑
t
piem,tdm,t +
∑
m
∑
t
Ψm,t
≥
∑
i
∑
t
piemi,tPi,t +
∑
i
∑
t
ΘGi,t
+
∑
t
∑
m→n
(piem,t − pien,t)FTRm→n
holds. That is, the total payments collected from loads and
uncertainty sources can cover the total credits to energy,
generation reserve, and FTR holders. So, the revenue adequacy
of the proposed market clearing mechanism is guaranteed.
E. Proof of Competitive Equilibrium
Proof. Pi,t and (Q
up
i,t, Q
down
i,t ) are coupled by constraints (15)
and (16). According to (17), we can rewrite generation reserve
credit as
piu,upm,tQ
up
i,t + pi
u,down
m,t Q
down
i,t =
∑
k∈K
piu,km,t∆P
k
i,t
=
∑
k∈K
(β¯ki,t −
¯
βki,t + α¯
k
i,t − ¯α
k
i,t)∆P
k
i,t
=
∑
k∈K
(
β¯ki,t(Iˆi,tP
max
i − Pi,t) +
¯
βki,t(Pi,t − Iˆi,tPmini )
+α¯ki,t(R
u
i (1− yˆi,t)) + ¯α
k
i,tR
d
i (1− zˆi,t+1)
)
(35)
Substituting (35) into problem (PMPi), we can decouple Pi,t
and (Qupi,t, Q
down
i,t ). In fact, we also get all terms related to
Pi,t in Lagrangian L(P, λ, α, β, η) for problem (RED). Since
the problem (RED) is a linear programming problem, the
saddle point Pˆi,t, which is the optimal solution to (RED), is
also the optimal solution to (PMPi). Consequently, unit i is
not inclined to deviate its output level as it can obtain the
maximum profit by following the ISO’s dispatch instruction
Pˆi,t. Therefore, dispatch Pˆi,t and price signal (piem,t, pi
u,k
m,t)
constitute a competitive partial equilibrium [27].
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